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The new architecture for the Joint Maritime Command Information System
referred to as JMCIS'98, seeks to provide uniform access to tactical and non-tactical
information. The goal is to allow access to such information using Wide Area Network
technology and Personal Computers ninning Windows NT in a web environment. This
architecture relies on web servers to deliver executable content, such as Java applets, to
clients and gateway servers to route requests to the appropriate servers and/or databases.
This architecture raises new security risks which must be addressed. Two of these
risks are addressed in this thesis: executing downloaded code from a web server and
transmitting sensitive information, such as passwords, to gateway servers.
We investigate three cryptographic protocols to address these risks. The first
protocol treats the risk of executing downloaded code from a web server by using digital
signatures. The second protocol addresses the transmission of sensitive information to a
gateway server by using certificates and symmetric key cryptography. Finally, we
explore an alternative approach, that of the Secure Sockets Layer, which provides mutual
authentication. We discuss how the first two protocols can be implemented in Java using
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The Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) is the United States
Navy's primary command and control system. The components of JMCIS allow ashore,
afloat and tactical/mobile users to communicate. Currently, the JMCIS architecture is
designed around UNIX servers and clients. The next generation of the JMCIS, named
JMCIS'98, seeks to use many of the recent revolutionary changes in the network
computing environment. Its aim is to provide a single, consistent architecture which will
cross sea and shore, as well as tactical and non-tactical boundaries. The JMCIS'98
architecture is being built around commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology,
specifically Microsoft Windows NT clients and servers operating in a web environment.
The JMCIS'98 Network Architecture is composed of clients, web servers,
gateway servers, access servers and databases. A typical scenario is one in which a client
connects to a web server and downloads executable content to accomplish a task. This
executable content may need to connect the client to a gateway server in order to query a
tactical database. The client sends database queries to the gateway server which then
forwards them to an appropriate access server. The access server responds to queries by
accessing the database. Query replies are then sent back to the client via the gateway
server.
The Java programming language has been used extensively in the re-engineering
of the JMCIS system. Java programs can be written as either applications or applets.
Java applets are intended to be embedded in a web page residing on a web server,
downloaded by a client across the network and then executed on the client's machine.
The functionality of JMCIS'98 will, to a great extent, be centered around Java applets.
Much of a client's interaction with JMCIS'98 will be via these Java applets. By using
applets downloaded from a web server for client functionality, JMCIS'98 will have a 'fat
server, thin client' architecture. This fat server, thin client architecture is expected to
dramatically ease system administrator efforts in such areas as configuration management
and maintenance. This approach also has the added benefit of being dynamically
configurable, by allowing a single change to the code on the server to affect all users,
thereby making time-consuming and expensive changes on each individual machine
unnecessary.
A. SECURITY ISSUES IN JMCIS'98
There is a pressing need for the Navy to provide security for its widely distributed
networks. Commanders must improve their ability to secure their information
infrastructure while simultaneously expanding its use in a global environment. Security
is an important consideration in the JMCIS'98 evolution. This thesis brings to light a few
of the relevant security considerations and some ways they can be addressed in today's
operating environment.
The JMCIS'98 architecture is built around a client downloading executable
content from a web server. Thus, as part of a safe, secure computing environment there
needs to be a means by which the client can establish trust in the code based on the origin
of the code. By being able to trust the code, the client can execute it with reasonable
assurance that the code is not malicious.
There will also be situations when the client and server will need to securely
exchange sensitive information. The client may need to connect to a gateway server for
the purpose of sending sensitive data, such as the client's name and password, as part of a
tactical database query. The gateway server will send this information to the appropriate
access server. The access server will check that the client is an authorized JMCIS'98
user and will then satisfy the request by passing the query to a database. The query
results are then forwarded back to the client, via the access and gateway servers.
Sensitive information, such as the client's name, password, the query and the query
response, should be protected during transmission across the network.
The goal of this thesis is to introduce two protocols that are intended for use as
part of the JMCIS'98 architecture and to discuss their implementation using the Java
programming language. These protocols, developed by Dennis Volpano at the Naval
Postgraduate School, are intended to allow for safe, reliable transfer of information
between clients and servers in a widely distributed networking environment.
Specifically, this work will introduce a Trusted Code Protocol designed to allow a
client to download trusted executable code from a server and safely execute this code.
An implementation of the Trusted Code Protocol using Java's Cryptography Architecture
is given. An alternative approach to verifying trusted code using the Java Developer's
Kit 1 . 1 functionality is also discussed.
A Secure Password Transmission Protocol is also introduced. This protocol is
designed to allow a client to make secure information exchanges with a server.
Information that may be passed in this situation includes such sensitive items as
passwords for establishing client authentication, thus confidentiality of this information is
required. An implementation of the this protocol, using Java's Cryptography Extension,
is developed in this thesis. An alternative to secure password transmission using
Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer technology is also discussed.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter II of this thesis describes the Joint Maritime Command Information
System, including its architecture and the changes that comprise the JMCIS'98 effort.
Chapter III provides a general overview of the Java programming language and its use in
applications and applets. Chapter IV provides a description of the cryptographic support
included in the Java Developers Kit version 1 . 1 , the Java Cryptography Architecture and
the Java Cryptography Extension version 1.1. Chapter V introduces the Trusted Code
and Secure Password Transmission Protocols and sketches their implementations using
the Java Cryptography Architecture and the Java Cryptography Extension. An alternative
to verifying trusted code, using the Java Developer's Kit 1.1, and an alternative to secure
password transmission using Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer are also discussed in
Chapter V. Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations for further work.

II. JMCIS'98
The Joint Military Command Information System (JMCIS) is the United States
Navy's primary Command and Control system JMCIS is undergoing an evolutionary
and revolutionary change to rapidly develop and field new Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities for Navy Afloat, Ashore
and Tactical/Mobile users. JMCIS'98 is the term used to describe the current
evolutionary efforts to the JMCIS architecture. The driving forces behind the JMCIS'98
strategy are:
• The migration ofJMCIS to the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII).
• Fleet requirements for merging tactical and non-tactical networks.
• Emerging Web and Personal Computer (PC) technologies to provide required
information/capabilities.
Migration to the DII Common Operating Environment (COE) is expected to bring
true interoperability across all the services. With the move to DII compliance, JMCIS
will be the naval implementation of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
The merging of Tactical and Non-Tactical (TnT) networks enables the fleet users
to perform both tactical and non-tactical tasks on a single workstation. This is intended
to eliminate redundancies and simplify training and system administration tasks.
Emerging Web and PC technologies allow for the migration of the JMCIS
architecture to PC servers and clients. JMCIS'98 planning calls for an incremental shift
from UNIX-based servers and clients to Personal Computer-based servers and clients.
This move is expected to yield numerous life-cycle cost benefits such as reducing the
fielding time of new computer systems, reduced training costs and is also in line with
other Department of Defense and Navy focus areas such as the extended use of
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf(COTS) products and Web technology.
JMCIS'98 represents a significant departure from "business as usual" through
which virtually all program processes, including acquisition, are being integrated and
streamlined. The JMCIS'98 effort includes a common strategy and implementation plan
for all components of JMCIS:
• Navy Tactical command System-Afloat (NTCS-A) is the afloat component;
• Operations Support System (OSS) is the ashore component, and;
• Tactical Support Center And Tactical Mobile Variants (TSC/TMV) is the
tactical/mobile component.
The JMCIS program office (PMW-171) has been tasked, whenever practical, to
implement functionality using commercial standards and products to reduce cost and
increase productivity of JMCIS development, testing and training. This strategy will
enable JMCIS to satisfy Fleet requirements faster and more effectively, and is expected to
reduce the current backlog of requirements.
In addition to migrating to the DII COE, JMCIS'98 builds will be fielded in
conjunction with equipment installations of the Information Technology for the 21 st
Century (IT-21) initiative whenever available resources exist for IT-21. Phase 1 of IT-21
provides an initial LAN and communications capability. Phase 2 adds additional
equipment and communications infrastructure to the capability including a full
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) backbone and large numbers of Windows NT
clients and Windows NT servers. [Ref. 1]
A. JMCIS'98 ARCHITECTURE
The JMCIS'98 network architecture centers around a client which accesses web,
gateway and access servers and their associated database(s). The functionality of this
architecture describes how a client can make a connection to the network through the web
server and download executable content. The client would then use this downloaded
code to make connections to a gateway server. The gateway server's function is to route
the client's database query to the appropriate access server. The access server will
authenticate the client. Assuming that the client's authentication is carried out
successfully, the access server will route the query to the appropriate databases. The
response to the query will then be forwarded back to the client via the access and gateway















Figure 2-1. JMCIS'98 Network Protocol
Steps one and two of Figure 2-1 illustrate a client accessing the web server and
downloading executable content. Steps three and four illustrate a client request being
sent to the gateway server and routed to the access server for client authentication. The
authenticated request is then passed to the appropriate database. Steps five and six
illustrate the query results being passed from access server to the gateway server and
finally, to the requesting client.
1. Migration Strategy
As part of the JMCIS'98 migration strategy, PMW-171 is investigating the use of
commercial products which serve as a bridge between current and desired technology.

These products are intended to increase the initiative's flexibility in moving current
UNIX applications to the PC and Web environments by enabling users with UNIX
workstations to run PC applications, and vice versa. While products designed to bridge
such gaps perform their intended function, they often accomplish this through a trade-off
(e.g., high demand for local network bandwidth and additional processing time) which
makes them undesirable for use within the target architecture. As such, they are viewed
as temporary solutions which ensure continuity of operations during the transition period.
Most will not be considered for permanent use within JMCIS'98. Figure 2-2 illustrates
the JMCIS'98 architecture and depicts the manner in which Personal Computers will











Figure 2-2. JMCIS'98 Architecture. [From Ref.l]
2. Personal Computer Architecture
Historically, the processing demands of JMCIS have made the power of UNIX
and high-performance workstations and servers a necessity. Even though the prices of
high-performance UNIX workstations have dropped slightly, they far exceed the cost of
Personal Computers. At the same time, PCs have become quite powerful, approaching
the performance of the UNIX workstations. The transition from UNIX workstations to
PCs results in a number of significant, cost-related benefits:

• Lower cost per workstation will allow JMCIS to be implemented consistently
on all ships, shore sites and JMCIS Tactical/Mobile sites;
• Lower cost per workstation will facilitate future periodic hardware
replacement, vice forcing maintenance of equipment that is no longer in use
in the commercial marketplace;
• Overall software costs for a PC-based JMCIS architecture are expected to be
considerably less than the cost of maintaining large development, training and
maintenance infrastructures for Government-Off-The-Shelf(GOTS) products;
• PCs offer an enormous selection of relatively inexpensive and user-friendly
software applications, including development tools, and market pressure has
resulted in a relatively uniform set of standards for sharing data;
• Many Fleet users are already accustomed to working on PCs, through school
and home use, which reduces training costs. [Ref. 1]
In contrast, current JMCIS UNIX workstations are expensive and many users
consider them difficult to use. Commercial hardware and software selection is limited
and expensive. UNIX requires skilled system administrators and costly programming
services to develop and maintain system software. Lack of user familiarity with UNIX
and the complexity ofUNIX training has led to performance and utilization shortfalls.
The migration to a PC architecture will make many tasks easier, and faster than
previously possible. JMCIS software developers will be able to use a wide selection of
commercial products and technologies, readily available in the PC market, to allow them
to focus on writing JMCIS value added software code. They will spend less time and
effort building infrastructure functionality and will be able to concentrate on putting the
highest quality C4I products into the field. Examples of commercially-accepted
technologies include the Common Object Model (COM), Object Linking and Embedding
(OLE), the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE), Common Object Request Broker
Architecture and graphical user interface (GUI) builders. By using these commercially
accepted technologies, JMCIS'98 will easily integrate COTS software with code written
specifically for JMCIS by JMCIS developers. With development taking advantage of re-
use and extension of software code written and tested by commercial developers, the
potential for creating errors is reduced drastically. This efficiency extends into testing,
evaluation, training and technical support.
3. Communications
JMCIS presently provides C4I services to the Fleet both Afloat and Ashore.
Afloat configurations can be categorized as force-level and unit-level configurations.
Additionally, the Mobile Integrated Command Facility (MICFAC) is a mobile command
facility designed to provide the Joint Task Force Commander with similar C4I
capabilities when forward-deployed ashore in a theater of operations. Ashore
configurations of JMCIS are located in Fleet command centers and JMCIS
Tactical/Mobile. Future plans will include Type Commands (TYCOM) also. In order to
allow for maximum interoperability among JMCIS and GCCS systems at all locations,
Afloat and Ashore, JMCIS will adopt a single communications medium to the maximum
extent possible. JMCIS will use the Secret IP Router Network (SIPRNET) and the Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) to provide the necessary wide-
area network (WAN) connectivity. The Joint Maritime Communications System
(JMCOMS) will provide the WAN connectivity for the Afloat and Tactical JMCIS
systems. Operating "system-high" at the Secret and SCI security levels, SIPRNET and
JWICS utilize the same protocols as the Internet (TCP/IP).
JMCIS locations will vary in how they connect to these networks. Command
centers will connect through land-based high-bandwidth connections; battle-groups
through satellite communication (SATCOM) and other circuits; and mobile facilities
through a combination of SATCOM and dial-up (STU-HIs, INMARSAT, etc.) provided
by JMCOMS via the Advanced Digital Network System (ADNS).
4. Phased Migration
The JMCIS architecture onboard a ship or within a command will look much like
it does today. One of the most significant differences, however, will be the phased
replacement of UNIX servers with Windows NT servers and UNIX client workstations
with Windows NT clients. In order to avoid using both a JMCIS PC and UNIX
workstation to perform separate functions, the architecture will require a phased
migration whereby segments are migrated in discrete groups (JUMPs). Figure 2-3
depicts the incremental stages by which today's JMCIS architecture will evolve into the
planned JMCIS'98 architecture utilizing Windows NT clients and servers.
10




UNIX Server UNIX Client
^_








PC Server PC Client
(c) Target Architecture
Figure 2-3. JMCIS Phased Migration to Personal
Computers [From Ref. 1]
5. JMCIS Security
The architecture of JMCIS'98 poses new challenges regarding how the
USN/USMC can continue to protect information from unauthorized access and
compromise. JMCIS is increasing its reliance on WANs such as SIPRNET and JWICS.
While the use of these networks unquestionably unlocks significant potential for
interoperability and communications at all levels of command, it also increases the need
to safeguard data. Integrity, Authentication, Trust, Denial of service attacks, packet
"spoofing," password cracking, are examples of common security issues that must be
addressed in order that Commanders may safely and efficiently use the JMCIS'98
architecture. In migrating to the PC environment, JMCIS recognizes the challenges
posed by computer viruses and Trojan Horses, which are a significantly greater concern
here than in the UNIX environment. The integration of tactical and non-tactical systems
11

will bring about additional security challenges. For example, non-tactical information
systems, which typically operate at confidential or unclassified levels, contain data that is
relevant to JMCIS.
The JMCIS'98 approach to information security is not to view it as a discrete
process or life-cycle phase implemented as a development stage. Rather, information
security will be practiced within all traditional life-cycle phases. It is being designed into
the system and is an integral part of testing as well as practiced and inspected in
operational JMCIS systems within the Fleet. The JMCIS'98 technical approach will
increase the roles and responsibilities of security personnel. In order to thoroughly
address the security issues inherent in the development of information systems, JMCIS
security engineers are tasked with:
• Improving existing security architecture on UNIX platforms in conjunction
with JMCIS'98 efforts;
• Contributing to the design of the interface between JMCIS and other tactical
and non-tactical systems;
• Producing security strategy that provides guidance and documents
preventative measures relating to computer security in development and
operation;
• Ensuring JMCIS'98 complies with the DII COE security checklist
(as outlined in JMCIS'98 Security Policy and Requirements);
• Developing security testing criteria and incorporate within test plans;
• Developing the capability to monitor, detect, report and prevent network
intrusion attempts;
• Monitoring security advisories published by the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT); notify the JMCIS Program Manager (PM), Deputy
PM and System Engineer when action is required; recommend courses of
action to take in:
- determining whether security breaches may have occurred,
- initiating corrective action against security vulnerabilities,
- mitigating risks to information security. [Ref. 2]
B. SUMMARY
JMCIS'98 represents a significant departure from the 'traditional' manner of
providing C4I in the Navy. JMCIS'98 will incorporate many of the latest trends in
12

computing and information sharing; from Windows NT based architecture to usage of
COTS products. JMCIS'98 will also rely more on WAN technology, specifically the
SIPRNET and JWICS. These evolutionary moves from a traditional UNIX environment
to one in which PCs and Web technology are center stage in the JMCIS architecture will
ensure that Commanders are able to communicate efficiently and effectively with their
forces, regardless of location. Security is an important consideration in the move to the
JMCIS'98 architecture. The move to PCs and Web-based technologies open up many
avenues of security problems that users of the Internet face every day. JMCIS'98 is
approaching these problems by making security a life-cycle issue to be taken into




A major part of the JMCIS98 re-engineering effort revolves around the use of the
Java programming language. Much of the functionality of JMCIS'98 will be
implemented using Java applets and applications. This chapter focuses on the Java
language and its security features.
Java is widely seen as the solution to many of the most persistent problems in
client/server computing and on the World Wide Web. Java applets can easily be written
and distributed across the World Wide Web, with or without direct user interaction. Java
allows developers the flexibility to write one applet or application which can be
distributed across a heterogeneous computing environment with little to no native code.
This code is 'guaranteed' to run on any computer as Java and the Java Virtual Machine
are resident. This is often referred to as 'Write Once/Run Anywhere.'
Java's ability to allow a central server to distribute cross-platform executable
content across a heterogeneous computing environment can be viewed a central building
block of implementing a 'thin-client/fat-server' system. In such a system, the client does
not need or want to have applications resident. Instead it will download the executable
when the service is required by a user. This setup has many advantages: configuration
management, version control, allowing use of diskless workstations, etc..
The ability to field Write Once/Run Anywhere executables, allows Java programs
written on one type of hardware or operating system to run unmodified on almost any
other type of computer. Thus, portability is a major advantage for Java. Java provides its
Write Once/Run Anywhere capability through the Java Virtual Machine. The Java
Virtual Machine is implemented on top of a machine's native operating system. Java
applications run on top of the virtual machine. The virtual machine insulates the
application from differences between underlying operating systems and hardware.
A. JAVA SECURITY RISKS
The ability to distribute executables automatically over the network raises security
concerns. Java addresses the problem by distinguishing applications from applets.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the Java Security Reference Model. Java programs can exist in two
forms: as applets, which travel across the Internet or intranet as part of a web page and
run inside ofthe end-user's browser, or as traditional stand-alone applications. Figure 3-1
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shows the relationships between Java applets and applications and the Java Virtual
Machine. One of the biggest security issues relating to Java is what should a Java applet
or application be allowed to do to the local machine. The differences between an applet








Figure 3-1. Java Security Reference Model [From Ref. 4]
1. Java Applications
Java applications add no new security concerns. Security comes from
maintaining physical control over the systems, preventing end-users from downloading
untrusted applications from the net, using virus checkers and other traditional security
measures.
2. Java Applets
Java applets are subject to special Java 'sandbox' security restrictions due to the
fact that they are regarded as 'untrusted' code which is generally downloaded over the
World Wide Web and run on the local host machine. Applets pose the most insidious
security threat since users often are unaware they are executing them though web
browsing and applets have the capability to run behind the organization's firewall.
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Applets are Java's form of executable content. They are a major security concern.
Applets are small pieces of executable code which may be included in Web pages and
run inside of the user's browser. While applets solve many of the important problems in
client/server and network-centric computing, they also raise new concerns about security.
Traditionally, organizations could protect themselves by controlling physical and network
access to their computers and establishing policies for what kinds of software can be used
on their machines. These steps include building a firewall between the Internet and the
organization's intranet, obtaining software only from known and trusted sources, and
using anti-virus programs to check all new software.
Use of applets potentially adds a new security vulnerability. A user searching an
external Web site for information might inadvertently load and execute an applet without
being aware that the site contains executable code. This automatic distribution of
executables makes it very likely that software will be obtained from untrusted third
parties. Since the applet is imported into the user's web browser and runs locally, this
software could potentially steal or damage information stored in the user's machine on a
network file server. Also, since this software is already behind the organization's
firewall, the applet could attack other unprotected machines on the organization's
intranet. These attacks would not be stopped by traditional security measures.
Java protects its users from these dangers by placing strict limits on applets.
Applets cannot read from or write to the local disk. Stand-alone windows created by
applets are clearly labeled as being owned by untrusted software. These limits prevent
malicious applets from stealing information, spreading viruses, or acting as Trojan
horses. Applets are also prohibited from making network connections to other computers
on the network. This prevents malicious applets from exploiting security flaws that
might exist behind the firewall or in the underlying operating system. While Java is not
the first or only platform that claims to be a secure means of distributing executable code
over the Internet, it is perhaps the best known and most widely used.
Java's security mechanisms are designed to allow a user to import and run applets
from the Web or an intranet without damaging the user's machine. The applet's actions
are restricted to its "sandbox." The applet may do anything it wants within the sandbox,
but cannot read or alter any data outside of its sandbox. The sandbox model's purpose is
to run untrusted code in a trusted environment so that if a user accidentally imports a
hostile applet, that applet cannot damage the local machine.
17
Java automatically confines applets to the sandbox. End-users do not have to take
any special action in order to ensure the safety of the machine. Because the sandbox
prevents the actions required to spread a virus or steal information, instead of trying to
identify a virus-infected executable or potential attacker, the sandbox does not require
periodic updates with new virus detection mechanisms.
As mentioned above, the actions an applet is allowed to perform is restricted by
the Java security mechanism. More specifically, if an applet has been loaded across the
network, it is not allowed to:
read files on the client file system
write files to the client file system
delete files on the client file system, either by using the File.deleteO method
or by calling system-level rm or del commands
rename files on the client file system, either by using the File.renameTo()
method or by calling the system-level mv or mkdir commands
create a directory on the client file system, using either by using the
File.mkdirs() methods, or by calling the system-level mkdir command
list the contents of a directory
check to see whether a file exists
obtain information about a file, including size, type, and modification time
stamp
create a network connection to any computer other than the host from which it
originated
listen for or accept network connections on any port on the client system
create a top-level window without an untrusted window banner
obtain the user's username or home directory name through any means
including trying to read the system properties: user.name, user.home,
user.dir, java.home, and java.class.path
define any system properties
run any program on the client system using the Runtime.execO methods
load dynamic libraries on the client system using the Ioad() or loadLibrary()
methods ofthe Runtime or System classes




• create a SecurityManager
• specify any network control functions, including ContentHandlerFactory,
SocketlmplFactory, or URLStreamHandlerFactory
• define classes that are part ofpackages on the client system
[Ref3:pp 35-36]
B. JAVA SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Java's Security Architecture is composed of several different systems operating
together. These systems range from security managers running inside of the application
which imported the applet, to safety features built into the Java language and the virtual
machine. The Java Sandbox security model can be described as a 'three-pronged attack.'




The term 'three-pronged' is used as the security model does not describe layers of
protection. A breach of one ofthe prongs leaves the system vulnerable. [Ref 3:p. 36] We
now take a close look at the Class Loader, Class Verifier and the Security Manager more
closely.
1. Class Loader
When an applet is to be imported from the network, the web browser calls the
applet class loader. The class loader is the first link in the security chain. In addition to
fetching an applet's executable code from the network, the class loader enforces the name
space hierarchy. A name space controls what other portions of the Java Virtual Machine
an applet can access. By maintaining a separate name space for trusted code which was
loaded from the local disk, the class loader prevents untrusted applets from gaining
access to more privileged, trusted parts of the system.
Applets downloaded from the net cannot create their own class loaders.




Before running a newly imported applet, the class loader invokes the verifier.
The verifier checks that the applet conforms to the Java language specification and that
there are no violations of the Java language rules or name space restrictions. The verifier
also checks for common violations of memory management, like stack underflows or
overflows, and illegal data type casts, which could allow a hostile applet to corrupt part
of the security mechanism or to replace part of the system with its own code. Figure 3-2





Figure 3-2. Java Language Security Checks [From Ref. 4]
3. Security Manager
The security manager defines the boundaries of the sandbox. The
SecurityManager class in Java implements a policy for the execution of untrusted code.
Normal applications do not use the security manager. The security manager is typically
only used by Web browsers, applet viewers, and other programs that need to run
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untrusted code in a controlled environment. [Ref 5:p 469] The default Security Manager
is quite restrictive, but methods can be overridden to allow more permissions if desired.
Whenever an applet tries to perform an action which could corrupt the local
machine or access information, the Java Virtual Machine first asks the security manager
if this action can be performed safely. If the security manager approves the action - for
example, a trusted applet from the local disk may be trying to read the disk, or an
imported untrusted applet may be trying to connect back to its home server - the virtual
machine will then perform the action. Otherwise, the virtual machine raises a security
exception and writes an error to the Java console.
The security manager will not allow an untrusted applet to read or write to a file,
delete a file, get any information about a file, execute operating system commands or
native code, load a library, or establish a network connection to any machine other than
the applet's home server.
An application or a web browser can only have one security manager. This
assures that all access checks are made by a single security manager enforcing a single
security policy. The security manager is loaded at start-up and once it is loaded it cannot
be extended, overridden or replaced. For obvious reasons, applets can not create their
own security managers.
C. SUMMARY
In any discussion of computer security and threats, it is well worth the time and
effort to identify any threats. In the case of Java programming for networked
environments, the security concerns can be classified as:
• System Modification - Java has strong defenses against this type of attack.
• Invasion of Privacy - Java has strong defenses against this type of attack.
• Denial of Service - Java has weak defenses against this type of attack.
• Antagonism - Java has weak defenses against this type of attack.
[Ref. 3:p. 30]
It is clear from the above list that the design of Java's security mechanisms was
intended to combat attacks that would modify the system and invade privacy. It is
important to note that individual organizations might want to strengthen or supplement
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Java's defenses against attacks. For example, a combat system must be able to survive
denial of service attacks as it must be available at all times.
Java's Developers made great efforts towards security. They recognized the
potential hazards of executing code that was downloaded from a network. The sandbox
was designed to contain Java applications to prevent damage (to the greatest extent
possible) from malicious code. However, restricting Java applets to the sandbox
eliminates much of the potential functionality. With the fielding of Java Developer's Kit
1.1 to replace version 1.0.2, Sun has made great strides to increasing the potential
functionality of Java applets without sacrificing the security ofthe sandbox model. These
changes to Java will be discussed in the next chapter.
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IV. JAVA CRYPTOGRAPHY ARCHITECTURE AND EXTENSION
In JDK 1.1, Sun Microsystems took steps to open up the functionality of applets,
without sacrificing the security of the sandbox model, by incorporating cryptographic
features to allow for 'trusting' an applet. This chapter will discuss this feature, as well as
outlining the changes to the language that make up the Java Cryptography Architecture
and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE 1.1).
A. JAVA'S NEW SECURITY FACILITIES
The Java Security Architecture goes a long way towards protecting the end-user's
machine and networked computing resources from damage or theft by a malicious applet.
Users can usually run untrusted code obtained from the network without harm to their
system.
The Java Security Architecture does not address several other security and
privacy issues. Authentication can be used to guarantee that an applet comes from the
place it claims to have come from. Digitally-signed and authenticated applets can be
promoted to the status of trusted applets, and then allowed to run with fewer security
restrictions. Encryption can ensure the privacy of data passed between an applet client
and a server on the Internet. The newest version of Java, contained in the Java
Developer's Kit (JDK) 1.1, does much to extend Java's security model in each of these
areas. Java's new security features include:
• Signed JAR Files
• Java Cryptography Architecture
• Java Cryptography Extension
1. Signed JAR files
All networked systems are potentially vulnerable to downloading and executing
malicious code. Java's designers took this into account when designing the Java Security
Architecture. Since the Security Architecture greatly restricts the activities of an applet,
as discussed in Chapter III, users could usually rely on the Java Security Architecture to
protect their system from malicious code. Java's designers also saw great utility in
allowing an applet to operate outside the security architecture. An applet that was
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afforded the privileges of an application would be more useful in many networking
environments. A prime example of this would be for a user to download an applet and
have that applet access files on the local machine or make connections to another server
on the user's behalf, as is needed in the JMCIS'98 network architecture. An applet that
was trusted to carry out these activities without harm is quite useful.
"Signed applets" give us the same level of confidence in network distributed
software as shrink wrap does to commercial software today. To sign an applet, the
producer first bundles all the Java code and related files into a single file called a Java
Archive, or JAR. The producer then creates a string called a digital signature based on
the contents ofthe JAR.
JAR files also help to alleviate another common networking problem. Currently,
many Java applets take a very long time to download and begin running. The problem is
that current Internet protocols move web pages across the Internet one file at a time.
Since there is overhead associated with each request for a file, web pages and Java
applets which are composed of many small files might spend more time requesting those
files and waiting for replies than they spend actually moving the information. Since a
JAR file bundles all the information needed by the applet and its web page into a single
file, the entire page can be downloaded with a single request. For many web pages, this
will greatly reduce download times.
JAR files and digital signatures can also be used for Java applications. While
Java applications are more trustworthy than applets because they do not travel over the
Internet and are subject to an organization's traditional security policies, applications are
subject to several types of attack. For example, viruses spread by modifying existing
applications to include a copy of the virus. Since a virus would not be able to produce a
valid digital signature for the altered program, the Java system could detect that a signed
application has been tampered with, and refuse to run it. Since the JAR signature system
will work with all types of information, not just Java files, JAR signatures can also be
used to protect data files and other information.
Since digital signatures allow us to assign to Java applets the same level of trust
which we assign to shrink-wrapped applications, it may be useful to relax the Java
security restrictions for some applets. Signed applets can be used to create such an
environment. If the end-user has previously told the Java system that a particular web
publisher is trusted and a signed applet from that publisher has arrived over the Internet
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and has been authenticated, then the Java Security Manager could allow that applet out of
the sandbox, and treat it as an application.
The Security Manager could also enforce different levels of control based on how
much a particular publisher is trusted, or on how much the Network as a whole is trusted.
A very security-conscious user could configure the system to allow signed applets to run
only inside the sandbox, and to prevent any unsigned applet from running at all. Another
user could configure the system to allow the applet to access only one particular directory
on the hard disk.
2. Java Cryptography Architecture
While the sandbox and signed applets can protect against malicious applets,
information traveling between the applet and a server on most networks is still vulnerable
to theft. This is because the network itself is an insecure medium, this may still be the
case in a "system high" network such as SIPRNET or JWICS in that there may be
authorized network users who are not authorized JMCIS'98 users. An attacker attached
to a central portion of the network can read all information which travels through that
portion of the network. To secure against this type of attack, all information flowing
between the applet and its server must be encrypted.
Java encryption facilities have recently been released and others are being
developed. These facilities will allow applet developers to select the type of encryption
algorithm used, to negotiate with the server to create the keys used in the encryption and
to do the actual encryption ofthe data.
The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) is the framework for accessing and
developing cryptographic functionality for the Java Platform. It encompasses the parts of
the JDK 1 . 1 Java Security API related to cryptography (currently, nearly the entire API),
as well as a set of conventions and specifications provided in this document. It
introduces Sun's default "provider" and the provider-architecture that allow for multiple
and interoperable cryptography implementations.
a, Java Security API
The Java Security Application Programming Interface (API) is built
around the java.security package and its subpackages. The first release of the Security
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API primarily includes support for digital signatures. This first release of Java Security







• Access Control Lists
[Refs. 6 & 7]
The structure of the Security API is designed to allow implementation
independence and interoperability, as well as algorithm independence and extensibility.
Implementation independence and algorithm independence aim to let users of the API
utilize cryptographic concepts, such as digital signatures and message digests, without
concern for the implementations or even the algorithms being used to implement these
concepts.
Implementation independence is achieved using a "provider-based"
architecture. Applications may simply request a particular type of object, and get an
implementation from an installed provider. If desired, an application may instead request
an implementation from a specific provider. When implementation independence is not
desirable, developers can indicate the specific implementations they require.
Algorithm independence is achieved by defining types of cryptographic
"engines" (algorithms), and defining classes that provide the functionality of these
cryptographic engines. These classes are referred to as engine classes, for example, the
MessageDigest and Signature classes.
Several methods of the MessageDigest and Signature classes are used in
Chapter V. The Signature class is used in the creation and verification of digital
signatures. Signature objects may have one of three states: unitialized, sign and verfiy.
We will use signature objects in implementing our protocols. A signature object is
unititialized at creation. The object can be initialized (prepared) for signing or verifying
by using either the initSign or initVerify methods. The object can be used to digitally sign
using the update method which supplies the data to be signed to the signature object and
then calling the sign method to create the signature. The signature object is also used to
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verify a signature by initializing the signature object for verification by calling initVerify
which prepares the object for verification. The data to be verified can then be supplied to
the signature object by calling update and then a call to verify for verification.
b. Cryptography Package Providers
Java Security is essentially an implementation independent layer. It
introduces the notion of a Cryptography Package Provider (referred to as a "provider").
This term refers to a package (or a set of packages) providing a concrete implementation
of a subset of the cryptography aspects of the Java Security API.
JDK1.1 comes standard with a default provider named "SUN". New
providers can be added either:
• Statically: An authorized administrator or user can add a provider to the
persistent list ofproviders that are available to all programs.
• Dynamically: An authorized program can add a provider at runtime for its
private or temporary use.
Java provides a set ofAPIs allowing users to query which providers are installed.
As mentioned above, the default provider in JDK1.1 is called "SUN".
This provider contains:
• Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST FIPS 1 86)
• MD5 (RFC 1321)
• SHA-1 (NIST FIPS 180-1)
"SUN" is the highest-priority (default) provider that provides the default
implementation. Preference order can be changed by the user, i.e., it is configurable.
The preference order is the order in which providers are searched for requested
algorithms when no specific provider is requested. [Ref. 7:p. 4] "SUN" also supplies a
simple system key and trust management mechanism, including a persistent database of
principals, keys, and X.509.vl certificates. The javakey tool interfaces with this
persistent database using a set of Java supplied APIs.
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3. Java Cryptography Extension
The Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) version 1.1 is a set of APIs for
cryptographic functionality, including symmetric, asymmetric, stream and block
encryption as well as key generation and management. There are also implementations in
Java of a subset of the APIs. The JCE supplements the functionality of the JCA.
Together, the JCE and the JCA provide a complete, platform-independent cryptography
API. The JCE is provided as a separate release due to United States exportation laws.
The JCE uses the same provider architecture as the JCA does.
The JCE provides APIs for:









• Built-in extensible multiple modes
Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
Cipher FeedBack Mode (CFB)
• Padding
Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #5
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) style padding
[Refs. 8 & 9]




• ECB and CBC modes
• PKCS#5-style padding
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[Refs. 8 & 9]
Note: Currently there is not an implementation of the RSA asymmetric key
cryptography algorithm in JCE 1 . 1 due to licensing restrictions from RSA.
Several of the JCE classes are used in implementing the Trusted Code and the
Secure Password Transmission Protocols discussed in Chapter V. Among them is class
Cipher. The Cipher class defines behavior for encryption and decryption, including
initialization as well as the encryption or decryption operation [Ref. 9:p. 2]. A cipher
object is used to carry out the encryption and decryption processes. Methods pertaining
to a cipher object include the creation, initializing and the encryption and decryption
processes. A cipher object is created by making a call to the appropriate cryptographic
algorithm using the getlnstance method. The newly created cipher object is unitialized.
The object can be initialized to encrypt or decrypt data by calls to the initEncrypt or
initDecrypt methods, respectively. Once the object is initialized for encryption or
decryption a call to the crypt method will carry out the intended operation.
The CipherlnputStream is also used by our protocol implementations. The
purpose of CipherlnputStream is to encrypt or decrypt the data that is passing through it.
Typically, this stream would be used as a filter to read an encrypted file. [Ref. 9:p.4]
B. SUMMARY
The Java Cryptography Architecture and the Java Cryptography Extension are
recent additions to the Java language and Java Developer's Kit 1.1 that add cryptographic
functionality. The JCA and JCE provide APIs for common cryptographic algorithms.
These cryptographic additions to the JDK allow for code signing and data encryption.
JDK 1.1 also allows for a trusted applet to enjoy the privileges of a local
application by using digital signatures and JAR files. A full implementation of this
system allows fine-grain tuning on what system privileges a particular applet is allowed
to use.
Java security continues to evolve to allow for more user-definable and robust
security measures. The security additions to the Java Developer's Kit 1.1 can be used to
implement protocols verifying trusted code and transmitting passwords securely. This is
the subject of Chapter V.
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V. JMCIS'98 SECURITY PROTOCOLS
The JMCIS'98 Network Architecture is composed of clients, web servers,
gateway servers, access servers and databases. A client connects to a web server and
downloads executable content to accomplish a task. This executable content may need to
connect the client to a gateway server. The client sends database queries to the gateway
server which then forwards them to an appropriate access server. The access server
responds to queries by accessing a database. Query replies are then sent back to the
















Figure 5-1: JMCIS'98 Network Protocol
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This chapter introduces and describes two protocols: the Trusted Code and the
Secure Password Transmission Protocol which were developed by Professor Volpano in
coordination with Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command JMCIS'98 engineers.
The former allows clients to download executable content, from a web server and decide
whether it can be trusted based on signature verification. The latter allows a client to
securely transmit passwords to a gateway server. Implementations of these two protocols
using features of Java's JDK 1.1, the Java Cryptography Architecture and the Java
Cryptography Extension will be described. We also describe Netscape's Secure Sockets
Layer technology and describe how it might be used in the JMCIS'98 Network
Architecture in place ofthe Secure Password Transmission protocol.
Section A of this chapter will discuss the Trusted Code Protocol and its
implementation using the Java Cryptography Architecture. Section B examines an
alternative approach using features of Java's JDK 1.1, specifically, signed JAR files and
the javakey database. Section C examines the Secure Password Transmission Protocol
and its implementation using the Java Cryptography Extension. Section D is a discussion
of SSL and its use in JMCIS'98 as an alternative to the Secure Password Transmission
Protocol.
A. TRUSTED CODE AND SECURE PASSWORD TRANSMISSION
PROTOCOLS
This section will present the Trusted Code and the Secure Password Transmission
Protocols, as developed by Professor Volpano [Ref. 11]. The following sections will
discuss how the Trusted Code and the Secure Password Transmission Protocols can be
implemented using the Java Cryptography Architecture and the Java Cryptography
Extension. An alternative to the Trusted Code Protocol using the Java JDK 1.1
functionality as well as an alternative to the Secure Password Transmission Protocol
using Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer technology are also discussed.
1. Trusted Code Protocol
The Trusted Code Protocol is intended to allow a client to download executable
content across the network and then establish trust in that code based on a digital
signature. The steps of this protocol are as follows:
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1. A client receives a class file as a signed entity from a web server. It extracts
the code signer's name N and checks whether it trusts N by looking for N in a local table.
The class file is rejected inN is not found.
2. Next, the client attempts to verify that N actually signed the code. In order to
do this it requests from the server a code-signer identity object for N (a certificate for N)
which is purportedly signed by some CA, say C.
3. Upon receipt of the certificate, it extracts the name of the CA contained in the
certificate, in this case C, and gets the public key for C that is held locally. It verifies the
certificate using Cs public key. This confirms that the public key in the certificate is the
public key ofthe name, say N', found in that certificate.
4. If N=N', it attempts to use the public key in the certificate to verify the
signature of the class file. If successful, the client knows that N signed the class file, and
since it trusts N, it executes the class file.
2. Secure Password Transmission Protocol
The Secure Password Transmission Protocol is concerned with the confidential
transmission of a password from a client to a server and the secure transmission of
information from that server back to the client. Unlike alternative approaches, the
protocol is not an authentication protocol, for it does not assume that a server and client
share a secret. The protocol does assume that every socket, which consists of an IP
address and a port number, has a public and private key. The protocol behaves as
follows:
1. A client requests from a server a public-key-signer identity object for the
server's socket S. The object is a certificate for S purportedly signed by a CA, say C.
2. Upon receipt of the certificate, the client extracts the name C and retrieves
what it believes locally to be Cs public key.
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3. It verifies the certificate using Cs public key. This confirms that the public
key in the certificate is the public key of the socket, say 5", found in that certificate. If
S=S', then the client generates a one-time symmetric key k and sends k, its password and
its name to socket S, bundled and encrypted together using the public key found in the
verified certificate.
4. The server at socket S attempts to decrypt the bundle. If successful, it services
some request with the supplied password and then sends the results back to the client
encrypted using the supplied key k.
In the final step, we say the server at socket S attempts to decrypt the bundle. The
idea is that a trusted server at socket S knows the private key for S, an untrusted server
does not. Thus an untrusted server at socket S must either send unverifiable socket
certificates for S to clients (by taking a valid signature for S and associating with it, its
own public key), or send a verifiable certificate, yet be unable to decrypt the bundle from
the client.
The one-time symmetric key also serves as a pad to prevent replays of an
encrypted password, just as a challenge does for a secret exchanged in the Point-to-Point
Protocol's (PPP's) Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP).
Before describing implementations of these protocols, we need to address
implementing the cryptographic keys they require. To assist in this, we will make use of
a utility package created for JMCIS'98. [Ref. 11] This package contains the Java
methods CreateKeys, SignBytes, CodeSignerlD, RunApp, SocketID, ConnectClient and
ServerSide. These methods will be described as they are encountered in the
implementations ofthe protocols.
3. Implementing Keys
Part of implementing the Trusted Code and the Secure Password Transmission
Protocols is implementing the cryptographic keys they require. The protocols require the
use of a Certification Authority (CA) who will issue certificates verifying the
trustworthiness of other entities, such as code signers, and server-side certificates for use
by the web and gateway servers.
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We describe how the two protocols can be implemented in a network environment
which includes a CA (a certificate authority), a code signer entity, named BigNavy, and a
gateway server, named Otter. We will be using the CreateKeys method from the
JMCIS'98 utilities package. It is used to create asymmetric keys for the Digital
Signatures Algorithm (DSA). [Ref. 7:p. 3 and Ref. 11]
First we create the asymmetric keys (public and private keys) for the CA and
BigNavy. Otter will be dealt with separately later in this chapter. For each identity there
will be associated .PublicKey and .PrivateKey files, e.g., BigNavy.PublicKey and
BigNavy. PrivateKey. CreateKeys creates a DSA public and private key for the entity
given as an argument.
As an example, CreateKeys generates the DSA key pair for BigNavy by the call:
Java CreateKeys BigNavy
This call creates two files; BigNavy. Private to store the BigNavy' s private key and
BigNavy. Public to store the BigNavy' s public key. Here is how the JCA is used in
CreateKeys:
KeyPairGenerator keyPairGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("DSAw);
ke\PairGen.initialize( 1024, new SecureRandomO);
KeyPair BigNavy = keyPairGen.generateKeyPairO;
This code is creating an instance of the key pair generating class for the DSA algorithm
In this example a 1024-bit public key is generated. Once the object is instantiated, it is
initialized with the key length and a random number generator. This random number
generator is provided by Java's SecureRandom class. The SecureRandom class is
intended to provide a software-based, platform independent, good-quality random
number generator. [Ref. 7:p. 16] The key pair generating object is then directed to
generate the key pair and save them (the .Public and .Private key files) in association with
the BigNavy entity.
4. Implementing Certificates
Certificates are now implemented for the CA, BigNavy and Otter by using Java's
Identity class. The identities are created in the form of Identity class objects, which are
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abstract and associate a name with a public key. The name contained in the identity is
immutable in that it cannot be changed, ensuring a one-to-one mapping between keys and
identities [Ref. 7:p. 14]. This is important in preventing malicious tampering with the
identity. A code signer identity is created for BigNavy using the CodeSignerlD method
included in the JMCIS'98 utility package.
Java CodeSignerlD BigNavy BigNavy.PublicKey
In this example, the code signer identity is created for BigNavy. A code signer
identity is a serialized identity object that associates a name with a public key. The
BigNavy identity is a code signer and is used to sign class files. It is represented by the
file:
BigNavy.Identity
Now we an have identity created for BigNavy. The next step is for the CA to
endorse the association by signing it in the form of what is usually referred to as a
certificate. The CA signs identities using its private DSA key. Recipients of the
certificate may verify it using the CA's public key. Certificates in our case are merely
signed byte streams, which bypasses issues of certificate format (ASN.l/DER), various
X.509 versions and other standards.
In order to generate certificates we use the SignBytes utility which is part of the
utility package designed for JMCIS'98. SignBytes creates a signed byte stream
certificate by signing an identity with the CA's private key.
Java SignBytes BigNavy.Identity CA
The CA only signs identities (.Identity files). The code signer, in this case BigNavy, will
sign the class files. We now have a signed identity in a file that ends with .sig:
BigNavy.Identity.sig
It serves as a "certificate" (signed identity) for BigNavy.
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B. TRUSTED CODE PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION USING JAVA'S JCA
The Java Cryptography Architecture provides the means to digitally sign code and
to verify the authenticity of these signatures. This JCA functionality can be used to
implement the Trusted Code Protocol.
The CA and the BigNavy code-signer have certificates. In implementing the
Trusted Code protocol using the JCA, the CA identity-signing certificate and the
BigNavy code-signing certificate are held on the web server. As an example of using the
JCA functionality, assume that navy programmers write and compile an application
called HelloWorld.Java. This application is then signed by the BigNavy code-signer to
verify that it is trustworthy code.
javac HelloWorld.java
Java SignBytes HelloWorld.class BigNavy
It is important to note here that a signature included in a certificate is computed
over a name and a public key. An assumption in this signing process is that only an
authorized code-signer (authorized to represent code-signer BigNavy) performs the
signing step after confirming the code is correct. The JCA calls that would make up the
method SignBytes, which is included in the JMCIS'98 utility package [Ref. 11], are
included below as indicative of the type of code that would be used. Using the DSA
implementation included in the JCA
,
we have:




byte[] SIG = dsa.signO;
Not shown here is that SignBytes produces the file HelloWorld.class.sig that contains the
signature SIG and the class file HelloWorld.class.
On the client side, a signed file is downloaded by a client by accessing a web
page. The client's intentions are to execute this code if it can be verified to be
trustworthy. The Java application RunApp is part of the JMCIS'98 utilities package
[Ref. 11]. RunApp implements the Trusted Code Protocol. The following call to
RunApp would run the HelloWorld.class file ifthe protocol succeeds.
Java RunApp HelloWorld.class.sig
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An example ofthe some JCA calls included in RunApp is given below.
Signature dsa = Signature.getInstance("DSAw );
dsa.initVerify(BigNavy.getPublicO):
dsa.update(HelloWorld.class);
boolean verifies = dsa.verify(SIG);
Here "S7G" is extracted from the signed class file HelloWorld.class.sig. An assumption
that we have made in considering Java's new code-signing features for inclusion in the
JMICIS'98 system is that nature versions of commercial browsers will implement these
features ofthe Java Cryptography Architecture.
C. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO VERIFYING TRUSTED CODE USING
JDK 1.1
Java's JDK 1.1 provides an alternative to verifying trusted code using signatures.
The JDK 1.1 approach is to package up application or applet (.class) files into a Java
Archive (JAR) file (described in Chapter EI). The JAR system was primarily designed to
allow for a method of establishing trust in Java applets downloaded across a network and
allowing these applets to operate outside ofthe sandbox model.
A JAR file is signed by a 'signer authority,' which combines the functionality of
the CA identity-signer and the BigNavy code-signer from above. The client trusts the SA
and thus trusts the code that is signed by the SA. The client will then be able to allow the
applet to execute outside of the sandbox, to include reading and writing to the local
(client) file system and making connections to another server, such as a gateway server.
The JDK 1.1 approach uses a certificate directive file. The purpose of this file is
to give the parameters to be included in the certificate and the file in which the certificate
will be stored. The following data are included in a typical certificate directive file.
• The identity of the signer
issuer.name=BigNavy




• The identification of the subject
subject.name=BigNavy




• Other parameters: start and end dates for validity and expiration of the





These certificates are required for use by javakey. The javakey tool is a
command-line interface to key and certificate generation and management tools in JDK
1.1. The javakey tool manages a system database of entities. Each entity may have
public and private keys and/or certificates associated with it. Each entity may be
declared to be trusted or not. Any entity in the database may be an "identity," which has
a public key associated with it, or a "signer," which has both a public and private key and
can sign files. The "identity" in this case should not be confused with the "identity" in
the JCA implementation of the Trusted Code Protocol. An identity in this case is simply
an entity that has been deemed to be trusted. On the client side, the SA would be an
identity and the client would hold the public key of the SA. This would allow the client
to verify the signed files received from the SA. An identity in the JCA approach can
either sign code or identities.
To implement the Trusted Code Protocol using the JDK 1.1 JAR file
functionality, we need to accomplish two steps, first to establish a trusted identity and,
secondly to download the signed JAR file and verify that it is from a trusted identity.
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1. Establishing a Trusted Entity
In order for the applet to be trusted, we must establish a code signer that will
certify the code and sign it. This approach is similar to that taken in the JCA
implementation. In the JCA approach, the CA trusted the code-signer and the code-
signer trusted the code. Since the client trusted the CA, the client could safely execute
code that was certified in this manner. In the JAR file approach, the code-signer trusts
the code and the client trusts the code-signer. Therefore the client can trust the code.
In the JAR file approach, a code-signing entity must be trusted by the client.
Suppose that this entity is "BigNavy." The steps that follow are those steps one must
take using JDK 1.1. The code fragment to establish this trusted entity and the fragments
that follow are intended to be only sketches ofthe code required to perform these actions.
• First create the BigNavy identity as a trusted entity in the identity database
usingjavakey as described above
javakey -cs BigNavy true
Generate a DSA 512-bit key pair for BigNavy, and store the public key in a
file named BigNavy_pub and the private key in a file named BigNavy^priv
javakey -gk Duke DSA 512 BigNavy_pub BigNavy_priv
Generate an X.509 certificate for BigNavy, and store it in the file
BigNavy_x509. This output file name is given in the directive file named
cert_directive_BigNavy
javakey -gc cert_directive_BigNavy
Create the Java Archive File
jar cf signedNavyApplet.jar navyApplet.cIass navyApplet.html
Sign the archive, using the parameters given in the sign_directive_BigNavy
javakey -gs sign_directive_Duke signedNavyApplet.jar
Move the signed archive to a file suffixed in .jar.
mv signedNavyApplet.jar.sig signedNavy.Applet.jar
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•You can show the contents of the signed archive using
jar tvf signedNavyApplet.jar
Finally, you can show the contents of the identity database using
javakey -Id
These steps illustrate sketches of the steps required to create the trusted identity in the
identity database, create the JAR file containing the appropriate files and to sign the JAR
file with the X.509 certificate ofthe trusted entity.
2. Downloading A JAR File
Once the applet is included in the signed JAR file, it is ready for retrieval. In a
web environment, the only difference between downloading the signed JAR file and any
other applet lies in the syntax of the hypertext markup language (HTML) tag. Below are
examples of a regular HTML tag and how the HTML tag would be constructed for our
sample trusted applet.
• Normal HTML Tag for a. class file
<applet code=navyApplet.class" width=500 height=50> </applet>
• HTML Tag for a JAR file
<applet code=navyApplet.class archive="signedNavyApplet.jar"
width=500 height=50> </applet>
The only difference in the HTML tags is the inclusion of the archive name in the tag for
downloading a JAR file.
Currently, only the Java applet viewer supports verification of signatures using
JDK 1.1. This functionality could, and probably will, be introduced in future versions of
the most popular browsers, such as Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer.
As mentioned above, the result of creating a trusted entity and having that entity
sign the executable content code, in this example a Java applet, is that the client can
download this code and execute it without the sandbox restrictions. The client is now
able to use this applet to make connections to servers other than the applet's origin server.
This has allowed us to successfully download an applet to the client from the server and
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have the client safely execute this code, as well as to allow the applet to read from and
write to the local file system. This is important in JMCIS'98 since an applet comes from
a web server and then connects to a gateway server.
D. IMPLEMENTING THE SECURE PASSWORD TRANSMISSION
PROTOCOL USING JAVA'S JCE
In the JMCIS'98 architecture, the job of the gateway server is to route requests
and queries from a client to the appropriate access server. A necessary part of this
section of the protocol entails the transmission of the user's password across the network
to the gateway server. It is of utmost importance that the confidentiality of the
information that is being transmitted between the client and the gateway server.
The following section will explore how the Java Cryptography Extension can be
used to implement the Secure Password Transmission Protocol. Section E below
discusses an alternative to secure password transmission using Netscape's Secure Sockets
Layer technology.
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the Java Cryptography and the Java Cryptography
Extension introduce a set of APIs for cryptographic functionality as well as
implementations of DES and 3DES in ECB and CBC modes which extend the default
"SUN" provider.
In order to implement the Secure Password Transmission Protocol we will use a
socket identity for server Otter. The purpose of this socket identity is to uniquely identify
the IP address and the port to which the server listens.
The Otter socket identity is created in the same way that the BigNavy code-signer
identity was created earlier in this chapter. Now the Otter certificate will associate the
name (IP address) and port the server listens to with a public key. In this case, the public
key will be generated by the RSA algorithm vice DSA in the BigNavy example.
To create the socket identity, the Java application SocketID (part of the JMCIS'98
utilities package) uses the following call:
Java SocketID otter.cs.1610 otter.cs.l610.PublicKey
This call to SocketID creates the Otter socket identity and stores it in file:
otter.cs.l610.Identity
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To create the certificate, the Otter socket identity is signed with the private key of the CA
by the following call.
Java SignBytes otter.cs.l610.Identity CA
The result of this call is the Otter socket identity certificate which has been signed by the
CA. This certificate is stored in the following (.sig) file.
otter.cs.1610.Identity.sig
We will use this certificate in the implementation of the Secure Password Transmission
Protocol. This certificate resides at the gateway server.
The first step ofthe protocol implementation is for the client to make a connection
to the gateway server and request the socket identity certificate for Otter. ConnectClient,
from the utility package, is used here to demonstrate how this could be accomplished.
ConnectClient implements the Secure Password Transmission Protocol. First a
connection is established between the client and the server, in this case the gateway
server Otter. The client then requests to download a signed socket identity for the
gateway server. The gateway server responds by supplying its socket ID certificate and
the CA's certificate verifying the servers socket identity to the client. The client, upon
receiving both certificates, extracts the name of the CA from the CA's certificate. The
client will use the public key it holds for that CA to verify the certificate. If verification
is successful, the client extracts the socket's public key from the CA's certificate. A
query object consisting of the client's name, password, query and a newly generated one-
time symmetric key are written to a file which is then encrypted using the socket's public
key.
On the server side the method ServerSide, from the utility package, simulates the
steps the server takes in the protocol. The gateway server Otter responds to the client-
originated query object by sending the results to the client, encrypted using the symmetric
key supplied by the client. The server then discards the symmetric key.
This protocol can not currently be implemented in JCE 1.1 since it does not
contain an implementation of an asymmetric cryptography algorithm, such as RSA. The
JCE 1 . 1 does not currently provide an implementation of RSA in Java, due to licensing
restrictions on RSA which prevent it from being implemented in Java. However, there is
an RSA API provided in JCE 1.1. This API is refined somewhat in JCE 1 .2 which is now
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available. Only the Data Encryption Standard (DES), a symmetric key cryptography
algorithm along with its associated key generation methods, is implemented in JCE1.1.
The following section provides an example of how the Secure Password
Transmission Protocol can be implemented using the JCE. This example uses RSA
asymmetric key and DES symmetric key cryptography. The protocol will be
implemented by having a client connect to a gateway server, retrieve the socket ID and
the CA certificates from the gateway server. Following verification of the identity of the
socket, the client will generate a symmetric key for the gateway server to use in
encrypting data for transmission from the server to the client. The client will bundle up
the client's name, password, the query and the symmetric session key and encrypt this
bundle with the gateway server's public key obtained from the socket ID certificate. The
gateway server will then decrypt the query bundle with its own private key. The session
key will be used to pass the query results back to the client. The gateway server will then
discard the symmetric key. It is important to point out that the client's query bundle is
encrypted with the gateway server's public key, thus only the correct gateway server
(Otter) is able to decrypt it. Without Otter's private key the query bundle is useless.
As an example, consider that the client has successfully connected to the gateway
server and has asked for and retrieved the certificate for Otter. The client will use the
CA's certificate to verify Otter, and Otter's certificate to verify the identity and obtain the
public key ofthe socket. Having accomplished this, the client can then generate a private
(symmetric) key to be as a "session" key for the gateway server to pass the query results
back to the client. The following example illustrates the functionality of the JCE using
the "SUN" provider. We will assume that the socket ID created in the introduction to this
section consists of an RSA asymmetric key for purposes of this example. The next step
is for the client to generate the key to be passed to the gateway server. A DES key is
created and passed as part ofthe query object.
• Generate a key
SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();
KeyGenerator keygen = KeyGenerator.getInstance("DES");
Key key = keygen.generateKey(random);
At this point the client has generated the symmetric key which will be included in
the query object, along with the client's name, password and the query itself. The query
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bundle is encrypted using the gateway server's public key (RSA) and the entire encrypted
bundle is passed to the gateway server.
The gateway server, upon receiving this query object, decrypts the package using
its own private key. The gateway server will then pass the client's name, password and
the query to the appropriate access server (refer to Figure 5-1) and will retain the
symmetric key to pass the query results back to the client. Upon receiving the query
results from the access server the gateway server will encrypt the results with the
symmetric key generated by the client. The following JCE calls illustrate how a cipher
object is created, initialized with a key and used for encryption.
• Create a cipher object
Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES","CBC","PKCS#5");
• Initialize the cipher object for encryption
des.initEncrypt(key);
• Encrypt
byte[] cipherQuery = des.crypt(query);
Next the gateway server sends the encrypted query results to the client. Then the
gateway server purges the symmetric key.
Upon receipt of the encrypted query results, the client will create its own cipher
object, initialize it for decryption and decrypt the query results. This process is
accomplished using the following calls.
• Create a cipher object
Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES'7'CBC","PKCS#5'');
• Initialize the cipher object for decryption
des.initDecrypt(key);
• Decrypt
byte[] decryptedQuery = des.crypt(cipherQuery);
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Thus, the client has initiated a query paired with a symmetric key, passes the
query to the gateway server encrypted with the gateway server's public key and received
a query response encrypted with the symmetric key.
E. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SECURE PASSWORD
TRANSMISSION USING THE SECURE SOCKETS LAYER
An alternative to the Secure Password Transmission protocol described above is
Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology. SSL, offered by Netscape in their
Secure Commerce Server, has gained wide spread use on the Internet as a means to
secure Web transactions, including financial transactions.
The primary goal of the SSL Protocol is to provide reliable private
communication between a server and client. SSL is composed of two layers, the Record
layer and the Handshake layer. At the lowest level, layered on top of some reliable
transport protocol (e.g., TCP), is the SSL Record Protocol. The SSL Record Protocol is
used for encapsulation of various higher level protocols. Starting with a message to be
transmitted, the Record Protocol fragments the data into manageable blocks, optionally
compresses the data, applies a Message Authentication Code (MAC), encrypts, and
transmits the result. Received data is decrypted, verified, decompressed, and
reassembled, then delivered to higher- level clients.
The SSL Handshake Protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each
other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before the
application protocol transmits or receives data. This negotiation process consists of the
client stating which ciphers and key exchange algorithms (i.e., RSA, Diffie-Hellman, or
Fortezza) it has in preferred order, the server checking to see if it has a compatible cipher
and key exchange and then signaling an agreement on a particular cipher. The Key
Exchange algorithm only is relevant when the server has no certificate, or a certificate
used only for signing (i.e., DSS or sign-only RSA). The agreement that is reached is the
SSL CipherSpec, the set of agreed upon ciphers in current use. The overall purpose of
the Handshake protocol is to agree on a CipherSpec.
One advantage of SSL is that it is application protocol independent. A higher
level protocol can be layered or implemented on top ofthe SSL Protocol transparently.
The SSL protocol provides connection security that has three basic properties:
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• The connection is private. Encryption is used after an initial handshake to
define a secret key. Symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption.
• The peer's identity can be authenticated using asymmetric cryptography.
• The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message integrity
check using a keyed Message Authentication Code (MAC). Secure hash
functions are used for MAC computations.
[Ref. 12]
SSL provides data encryption as well as authentication. It uses asymmetric
cryptography, through RSA, Diffie-Hellman or Fortezza's Key Exchange Algorithm
(KEA), to exchange a symmetric key. The symmetric key is then used to encrypt data for







It is the responsibility of the SSL Handshake protocol to coordinate the states of
the client and server. An SSL session consists of a session identifier, a peer certificate, a
compression method and a cipher specification. The SSL session may include multiple
secure connections, i.e., each connection using the same session identifier. This is
accomplished by allowing sessions to be resumable, as indicated by the session identifier
and the is_resumable flag as described below. Additionally, clients and servers may be
involved in multiple simultaneous sessions.
1. Record Layer
As mentioned above, the Record layer is the lowest of the SSL layers. The SSL
Record Layer receives uninterpreted data from higher layers in non-empty blocks of
arbitrary size. The record layer is responsible for fragmenting this data into SSLPlaintext
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records of214 bytes or less. These records are composed of unencrypted text, which will
be compressed and encrypted later. Client message boundaries are not preserved in the
record layer. Also, application data is generally of lower precedence for transmission
than other content types.
The Record layer is also responsible for compression and decompression of data.
All records are compressed using the compression algorithm defined in the current
session state. There is always an active compression algorithm. Initially it is denned as
CompressionMethod.null indicating that there is no compression A
CompressionMethod.null operation is an identity operation, no fields are actually altered.
This operation is simply a means of insuring data is in the proper format
(SSLCompressed) without actually doing compression. The compression algorithm
translates an SSLPlaintext structure into an SSLCompressed structure, indicating that the
structure is now compressed, even if the compression method was set to null.
Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length by more than 1 024
bytes.
Decompression functions perform the opposite function on the receiving end. If
the decompression function encounters a situation where the compressed structure would
decompress to a length in excess of 214 bytes, it issues a fatal alert. Similarly,
decompression functions are responsible for ensuring that messages cannot cause internal
buffer overflows.
All records are protected using the encryption and MAC algorithms defined in the
current CipherSpec. There is always an active CipherSpec, however, it is initially null,
indicating that SSL security services are not being used. The handshake will decide upon
an agreeable CipherSpec in order to gain security.
Once the handshake is complete, the two parties have shared secrets which are
used to encrypt records and compute keyed MACs on their contents. The techniques
used to perform the encryption and MAC operations are defined by the CipherSpec. The
encryption and MAC functions translate an SSLCompressed structure into an
SSLCiphertext, indicating that the structure is encrypted and secure. Transmissions also
include a sequence number so that missing, altered, or extra messages are detectable.
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a. Change CipherSpec Protocol
As mentioned above, the initial cipher suite for SSL is null, indicating that
none of the desired MAC or encryption is taking place. The purpose of the Handshake
Protocol is to negotiate a set of ciphers for a client and server. Thus, a means of changing
from one CipherSpec to another is need. This is the purpose of the Change Cipher Spec
protocol. The change cipher spec protocol exists to signal transitions in ciphering
strategies. The protocol consists of a single message, which is encrypted and compressed
under the current (not the pending) CipherSpec.
The change cipher spec message is sent by both the client and server to
notify the receiving party that subsequent records will be protected under the just-
negotiated CipherSpec and keys. Reception of this message causes the receiver to copy
the read pending state into the read current state. Separate read and write states are
maintained by both the SSL client and server. When the client or server receives a
change cipher spec message, it copies the pending read state into the current read state.
When the client or server writes a change cipher spec message, it copies the pending
write state into the current write state. The client sends a change cipher spec message
following the handshake key exchange and certificate verify messages (if any), and the
server sends a change cipher spec message after successfully processing the key
exchange message it received from the client. An unexpected change cipher spec
message should generate an alert.
2. Handshake Protocol
The cryptographic parameters of the session state between the client and server
are negotiated by the SSL Handshake Protocol, which operates on top of the SSL Record
Layer. When a SSL client and server first start communicating, they agree on parameters
such as protocol version, cryptographic algorithms, optionally authenticate each other,
and use public-key encryption techniques to generate shared secrets. These processes are
performed in the handshake protocol, which is summarized below.
The client sends a client hello message to which the server must respond with a
server hello message, or else a fatal error will occur and the connection will fail. The
CipherSuite list, passed from the client to the server in the client hello message, contains
the combinations of cryptographic algorithms supported by the client in order of the
client's preference (first choice first). The server will select a cipher suite or, if no
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acceptable choices are presented, return a handshake failure alert and close the
connection.
The client hello also includes a list of compression algorithms supported by the
client, ordered according to the client's preference. If the server supports none of those
specified by the client, the session must fail.
The client hello and server hello are used to establish the CipherSpec. The client
hello and server hello establish the protocol version, session ID, cipher suite, and
compression method. Two random values are also generated and exchanged which are
later used to generate keys.
Following the hello messages, the server will send its certificate, if the server is to
be authenticated. If the server is authenticated, it may request a certificate from the
client, if that is appropriate to the cipher suite selected. These certificates are signed by a
Certificate Authority that both the client and server recognize.
Now the server will send the server hello done message, indicating that the hello-
message phase of the handshake is complete. The server will then wait for a client
response. If the server has sent a certificate request message, the client must send either
the certificate message or an alert stating that it has no certificate.
The client key exchange message is now sent, and the content of that message will
depend on the public key algorithm selected between the client hello and the server hello.
The choice of messages depends on which public key algorithm has been selected. If
RSA, Diffie-Hellman or Fortezza are being used, a pre-master secret is generated and
included in the client key exchange message. This pre-master secret is used for key
generation as discussed below.
IfRSA is being used for key agreement and authentication, the client generates a
48-byte pre-master secret, encrypts it under the public key from the server's certificate or
temporary RSA key from a server key exchange message, and sends the result in an
encryptedpremaster secret message.
Under Fortezza DMS, the client derives a Token Encryption Key (TEK) using
Fortezza's Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA). The client's KEA calculation uses the public
key in the server's certificate along with private parameters in the client's token. The
client sends public parameters needed for the server to generate the TEK, using its own
private parameters. The client generates session keys, wraps them using the TEK, and
sends the results to the server. The client generates Initializing Vectors (IVs) for the
session keys and TEK and sends them also. The IV for the TEK is protected using the
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KEA. The IV for the session key is protected by the TEK. The client also generates a
random 48-byte premaster secret, encrypts it using the TEK, and sends the result to the
server. This premaster secret is used to generate keys.
At this point, a change cipher spec message is sent by the client, and the client
copies the pending CipherSpec into the current CipherSpec. The client then
immediately sends the finished message under the new algorithms, keys, and secrets. In
response, the server will send its own change cipher spec message, transfer the pending
to the current Cipher Spec, and send its Finished message under the new Cipher Spec.
At this point, the handshake is complete and the client and server may begin to exchange
application layer data.
When mutually agreed upon, a SSL session may be resumed or duplicated. This
is indicated by using a previously or currently active Session ID. The main reason for
doing this is to avoid having to negotiate new security parameters. A session will end
once all connections that are part of the session have terminated. The decision regarding
how long a Session ID should be good for or whether it should be cached is up to system
designers. When the client and server decide to resume a previous session or duplicate an
existing session (instead of negotiating new security parameters) the message flow is as
follows:
The client sends a client hello using the Session ID of the session to be resumed.
The server then checks its session cache for a match. If a match is found, and the server is
willing to re-establish the connection under the specified session state, it will send a
server hello with the same Session ID value. At this point, both client and server must
send change cipher spec messages and proceed directly to finished messages. Once the
re-establishment is complete, the client and server may begin to exchange application
layer data. If a Session ID match is not found, the server generates a new session ID and
the SSL client and server perform a full handshake.
3. Applying SSL to JMCIS'98 and Secure Password Transmission
SSL is a transport layer protocol which allows for the secure connections that are
needed to transmit sensitive data and can be used in JMCIS'98 as an alternative to the
Secure Password Transmission Protocol described earlier in this chapter.
SSL uses a handshake between the client and server to negotiate a cipher suite
which includes the choice of asymmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography and
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Message Authentication Codes algorithms. SSL can easily be implemented in JMCIS'98
as it is a mature technology, supported and updated by Netscape and is in wide use on the
Internet, especially to secure financial transactions.
In a JMCIS'98 context, SSL allows a client to connect to a gateway server,
negotiate a set of cryptographic functions to secure the connection and then safely
transmit sensitive information. SSL encrypts all data that flows across the connection.
Thus all information will be secure. SSL allows for a client to authenticate a server
before conducting secure transactions. Thus, the client can be comfortable with the
identity of the server with which it is conducting transactions. SSL also allows for client
authentication to the server. Therefore, SSL can be used to mutually authenticate the
server and the client.
SSL does require a lot of overhead. For authentication a Certificate Authority and
(at least) server-side certificates are required. We also mentioned above that optional
client authentication was available. However, this would require each client to maintain
an individual certificate. Additionally, the server would be required to verify the
certificate which would become quite taxing on the system if usage were high. Caching
Session IDs can help alleviate the problem, but is not a solution. During periods of high
usage, mutual authentication would likely degrade system performance to the point that it
would be unacceptable to a command and control system. If SSL were implemented we
recommend only using server authentication. Note: client authentication has not been
listed as being required nor desired.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has introduced the Trusted Code and the Secure Password
Transmission Protocols developed by Dennis Volpano. We then discussed how these
protocols could be implemented using features of Java's Java Developer's Kit 1.1, the
Java Cryptography Architecture and the Java Cryptography Extension. An alternative to
the Secure Password Transmission protocol using Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer
technology was also introduced and discussed. The following chapter gives our
conclusions and recommendations for further research.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The goal of this thesis was to develop protocols to allow a client in a web
environment to download and execute trusted code and to allow the client to securely
transmit sensitive data such as a password to a gateway server.
Java provides mechanisms in the Java Developer's Kit 1.1, the Java Cryptography
Architecture and the Java Cryptography Extension to implement these protocols. These
features of Java are in their infancy and will surely change with time. However, Java has
provided the APIs for the most common cryptographic mechanisms, including symmetric
and asymmetric key cryptography, as well as Java implementations ofsome ofthem.
The functionality that is resident in these Java mechanisms allows for the type of
cryptographic protection that are required by the Trusted Code and Secure Password
Transmission protocols developed by Professor Volpano. These two protocols can be
implemented using the features found in the Java Cryptography Architecture and the Java
Cryptography Extension.
Chapter V introduced the Trusted Code and the Secure Password Transmission
protocols which seek to securely carry out steps one through four of the JMCIS'98
Network Architecture (refer to Figure 1-1). These protocols solve the problem of clients
downloading and executing trusted code from a server and secure password transmission
from a client to a gateway server. Additionally, alternatives to the Trusted Code protocol
using JDK 1 . 1 signed JAR files and to the Secure Password Transmission protocol using
Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer were introduced and discussed.
Although Java is constantly evolving, especially in terms of security features and
functionality, the mechanisms to support our protocols are readily available. We have
made some assumptions in considering an operational implementation, namely that
commercial web browsers would catch up to the JDK implementation discussed here.
The Trusted Code protocol can be implemented using the functionality provided
in the Java Cryptography Architecture, specifically by using certificates and digitally
signing the code that will be transmitted across the network. This approach can digitally
sign any file that can then be verified as trustworthy by a client. The JDK 1.1 JAR file
alternative involves packaging the files that will be transferred into a JAR file which is
then digitally signed. Once a client receives this JAR file, the client will check to see
whether the signer is listed in the client'sjavakey database as being trusted. If the signer
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is trusted, the code is accepted and can be executed. The JCA implementation can sign
any type of file, whereas the JAR file approach will only sign a JAR file. Furthermore,
thejavakey database is command line driven and creating and maintaining it is somewhat
cumbersome.
The Secure Password Transmission protocol can be implemented using the
functionality of the Java Cryptographic Extension. Again, we have assumed for the sake
of this thesis that an implementation ofRSA in the JCE is forthcoming. The JCE allows
a client to use asymmetric key cryptography (i.e., RSA) to securely pass an object
consisting of a user's name, password, query and a symmetric key (i.e., DES) to a
gateway server. The gateway server will then be able to pass query results back to the
client encrypted with the symmetric key that each of them now share. The SSL
alternative to this protocol is similar in that asymmetric cryptography is used to exchange
a symmetric key that will be used for bulk encryption. However, in SSL the asymmetric
cryptography is used only in the process of negotiating, creating and exchanging a pair of
symmetric (session) keys, one for each direction of transmission. Once this has been
accomplished, the symmetric keys are used to encrypt all of the data that will flow
between the client and the server. Thus the SSL approach will encrypt all of the data that
is flowing between the client and the server for duration of the session. SSL also allows
for the client to be authenticated by the server, but this would entail the client maintaining
a client-side certificate. We have assumed that the burden of creating and maintaining
client certificates would be prohibitive in an environment such as JMCIS'98.
As stated in Chapter V, the biggest assumption made in this thesis is that
commercial browser technology would catch up to the levels ofJDK 1.1, the JCA and the
JCE. This is not an unreasonable assumption. However, to be useful in a JMCIS'98
environment the browser(s) must implement these mechanisms as they are defined by
Sun in the JDK. We have not assumed that all JMCIS'98 clients would use a single
browser, however this is a logical assumption and would probably be best from a systems
administrator point-of-view. Certainly, if these recommendations are to be implemented
in JMCIS'98 there would need to be further research to ascertain how and when the
functionality of the JDK 1.1, the JCA and the JCE 1.1 would be available in the
commercial browsers.
There are also other areas that require further research and consideration before
these protocols could be implemented on a large-scale. The choice of a certificate
authority or certificate authorities is of concern. Research must be done to determine the
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type of certificates that would best suit the JMCIS'98 architecture and how those
certificates should be generated and distributed.
Key management is also a critical issue. Depending on exactly which approach is
taken with regard to the protocols presented in this thesis, key management will be a
large part of the questions that must be answered in order to implement the protocols in a
Navy-wide system A key management infrastructure must be planned which will take
into account such issues as how servers generate, distribute and revoke keys and
certificates.
A determination should be made about how much security should be applied to
areas such as trusted code and confidentiality within a system that is running in a system-
high environment, as JMCIS'98 will be running over SIPRNET (Secret-level) and
JWICS (Top Secret SCI-level). Adding the type of cryptographic functionality as
described in this thesis will add to the overhead expense (i.e., administrative burden, time
required for cryptographic functions, etc.,) of operating the system. A detennination
should be made at the highest levels of the JMCIS'98 arena that the system speed and
performance degradation that would be involved in implementing any of these protocols,
or their alternatives, can be reasonably absorbed in a command and control system.
It is also important to keep in mind that the protocols rely critically on being
correctly implemented. We assume that the implementations of the Java API are correct.
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